rightly affirm, there is a distinctively republican understanding of freedom, and they broadly agree about how this understanding should best be expressed. According to the republican tradition, as they see it, freedom is a negative concept, and essentially consists in not being dominated by any other person or group. They are also in agreement about what it means to speak of being dominated. To be in this predicament, as Pettit puts it, is to find yourself living in subjection to the 'alien control' of another person or group. This further concept is in turn explicated -by Halldenius as well as by Pettit -in terms of the capacity of one person or group arbitrarily to interfere with what another can do, and thus with their patterns of choice and behaviour.
This power of alien control, Pettit goes on, can always be exercised by acts of direct interference. Like Halldenius, however, he is more interested in a different form of the same power, a form in which an agent's capacity to choose and act according to their own will is limited without any overt interference taking place. The agent in these instances is dominated by what Pettit calls the 'invigilation' of their choices and behaviour. The dominating party keeps an eye on the choices of the dominated, standing ready to intervene if these are not to his or her taste. The dominated correspondingly find their choices limited by what they believe their dominus or master may be willing to tolerate, and are forced to adjust their behaviour in the hope of staving off any interventions detrimental to their interests.
As Pettit and Halldenius both emphasize, what is bad about such relationships of domination and dependence is that they undermine the status of the dominated as free agents, and indeed take away that status altogether. There is nothing that the dominated 'can do' simpliciter; all their actions have the character of permissions, of actions they can perform if and only if their invigilating dominus chooses not to intervene. The evil of domination, as Pettit summarizes, may therefore be said to stem from a refusal to recognize that 'what marks us off as a species is that we are each able to make our choices, and indeed to form our beliefs, in a reason sensitive way'. To live under a dominus is to live in circumstances in which there is no place for such reasoned powers of choice to be respected.
Ivison sees a contrast at this juncture between two rival versions of negative liberty. On the one hand there is the quintessentially Hobbesian view, according to which any act of interference entails loss of freedom; on the other hand there is the republican theory, according to which it is only acts of arbitrary interference that have this effect. There is certainly a distinction of importance hereabouts, but I agree with the rather different formulation offered by the other symposiasts, all of whom suggest that the distinctively republican argument is one about subjection to arbitrary power, and hence about the possibility rather than the actuality of arbitrary interference. The hated figure of the dominus in the republican tradition is someone who hopes to be able to exercise his or her invigilating powers successfully without ever having to stoop to actual interference.
I have no serious quarrel with this account of what it means to live under a dominus, and it is obviously helpful to phrase the argument in this fashion if one wishes
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-as do all our symposiasts -to deploy the republican tradition in such a way as to make a polemical intervention in current philosophical debates. Among contemporary political theorists, at least in the Anglophone tradition, some version of the Hobbesian contention that freedom consists solely in absence of interference continues to hold sway. This being so, it is particularly arresting -particularly neat, one might even say -to confront this claim with the analogous yet rival contention that liberty consists not in absence of interference but in absence of domination. A further value attached to this way of presenting the argument is that it enables the most important difference between the liberal and the republican position to be unambiguously brought out. Whereas liberal political theorists deny that there can be any loss of liberty in the absence of some act of interference, republicans affirm there can be loss of liberty even where no interference takes place.
If, however, we return for a moment to the early-modern theorists I began by listing, it is striking to find that, in discussing the concept of political liberty, they rarely if ever place their main emphasis on the importance of not being dominated. To reconstruct their theory in these terms, as all our symposiasts have done, is to imply that their chief concern must have been to explicate the concept of free action. But the early-modern writers are not principally concerned with the concept of action at all. Rather they are chiefly interested in what it means to be a liber homo, a free person living among other such persons under a civil association or state.
What, then, does it mean according to these writers to be a free person? They answer by invoking a distinction that had been paramount in the law of persons ever since it had been formulated in the Digest of Roman law in late antiquity. To be a liber homo is not to be a slave, and hence not to be in potestate, in the power of another person and hence at their mercy. The early-modern theorists answer the question, in other words, in purely negative terms. What it means to be a free person is not to be dependent -in the manner definitive of servitude -upon the will, and hence upon the mere goodwill, of anyone else.
Of no less importance to the early-modern theorists is the fact that, in speaking of such liberi homines or 'freemen', they take themselves to be putting forward not merely a legal definition of civil liberty but an image of citizenship. This image was eventually encapsulated in a set of phrases that have never ceased to figure in the stories we tell about the significance of autonomy and independence. To be a freeman, the early-modern theorists affirm, is equivalent to being 'your own man', not beholden to a patron or master, not the creature or dependant of anyone else. A freeman is consequently someone to be reckoned with, someone who can look you in the eye, who can reason and negotiate on terms of equality without ever feeling the need to doff the cap or bend the knee. As a result, freemen are said to enjoy the respect -and the self-respect -that comes of being known to speak frankly and behave without fear or favour, acting solely as reason and conscience dictate.
These features of the republican vision of civil liberty suggest that it must be inherently normative. Pettit wishes to resist any such inference, rightly insisting that the question of whether someone exercises alien control and hence arbitrary power over someone else must be a purely empirical one. If, however, we equate the person who is not subject to arbitrary power with the figure of the freeman -as the early-modern theorists do -then we are left confronting an account of freedom so strongly normative as almost to constitute a picture of civic excellence. As Laborde observes, we perhaps need to concede that all conceptions of human liberty are likely to be so closely connected with implicit accounts of human interests as to be 'inevitably moralized'.
So far I have suggested that what motivated the early-modern republican theorists was less a desire to defend a particular conception of free action than a desire to foster a particular civic ideal, an ideal centred on the values of equality and independence. This is not in the least to say, however, that the early-modern theorists were uninterested in the question of what it means to be free to act and able to act freely. On the contrary, this is the moment at which we come upon the first of the two slogans in which they like to summarize their case. It is possible to act freely, they maintain, if and only if you are a freeman. If instead you live as a slave, you can never act as a free agent under any circumstances. This is not necessarily because your choices and actions will be impeded, but rather because they will never be the product of your own autonomous will. They will inevitably be a product both of what you will and desire and of what your dominus may be willing to permit.
If freemen, by contrast, are distinguished by having the liberty to act at will, is this equivalent to having the right so to act? Ivison and Halldenius both raise questions about the place of rights within the republican scheme of things. Ivison is worried that the republican tradition may be insufficiently hospitable to the idea of rights, and it is certainly true that none of the early-modern writers I have mentioned can be said to structure their arguments in such a way as to give the concept much salience. They rarely speak of rights as claims that stand outside the boundaries of the state and enable us to judge its legitimacy, and they frequently discuss the relations between states and citizens -as Machiavelli does in his Discorsi -without invoking the vocabulary of rights at all.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult, and it is not even anachronistic, to reformulate some of their claims about the objectionable nature of arbitrary power by saying that the mere existence of such power involves a denial of rights. If you are not a freeman, but instead live in dependence on the goodwill of a dominus, it follows that you will be able to act only by the grace of your master, only with his or her implicit permission, which can be withdrawn with impunity at any time. But to say that all your actions are performed as a matter of grace is to say that none of them can ever be performed as a matter of right. As the Digest of Roman law expresses the point, the essence of your predicament is that you are unable to act sui iuris, in your own right, because you are wholly restricted to acting only as your dominus may be willing to allow. But another way of phrasing this claim would be to say that, if you lose the status of a freeman, you will find yourself bereft of civil rights.
Halldenius suggests that we can carry this argument much further. The essence of the republican view of free action is that to act freely is to act according to your own will without being dependent on the will of anyone else. But to speak of possessing this capacity, Halledenius argues, is to speak in effect of having an entitlement to act without being vulnerable to other people's whims and preferences. To possess such an entitlement, however, is what is ordinarily meant by possessing a right. So on this account there is nothing less than a complete structural affinity, as Halldenius calls it, between republican liberty and claims about rights.
III
As well as celebrating the figure of the independent liber homo, the early-modern republicans I have been considering are much concerned with the legal and constitutional arrangements that need to be established if the freedom of such freemen is to be satisfactorily upheld. With their solution to this problem they arrive at the second of the two slogans that serve to summarize their case. Just as it is possible to live and act freely if and only if you are a freeman,
they argue, it is possible to live and act as a freeman if and only if you live in a free state.
When these writers discuss the freedom of free states, they employ the term in precisely the same way as they do when discussing the freedom of freemen. To describe a civil association as free, they maintain, is to say that it is capable of acting according to its own will -that is, according to the general will of its citizens -as a result of not living in dependence on the will of anyone other than the citizen-body as a whole. As Halldenius helpfully reminds us, a further important distinction can be drawn at this point between liberal and republican understandings of liberty. According to the former, civil laws are inevitably the enemies of individual liberty, since their imposition always involves the use of force or the threat of it. But according to the latter, any civil law which I help to enact, and to which I agree to submit myself, can be construed as an expression of my will rather than a restriction upon it, and must therefore be compatible with my liberty.
There are two distinct ways, the republican theorists add, in which it is possible for a body politic to lose the capacity to act according to its own will and thereby lose its standing as a free state. One is when the power of the state falls under the control of anyone other than the sovereign body of the citizens, whether the usurping agent be a monarch, an oligarchy or a ruling class. The other possibility is that the state may fall into a condition of dependence upon the will of another state, whether as a result of conquest, colonization or any other process that has the effect of bypassing the will of its citizens as the source of the law. When either of these disasters occurs, those who come to be excluded from giving their consent to the laws by which they are governed find themselves reduced to dependence on the will of those who have arrogated to themselves the power to make the laws and impose them. As the republican theorists have already explained, however, to live in such a predicament is what it means to live as a slave. This, then, is how it comes about that, unless you live in a free state, you will find yourself bereft of your own individual liberty.
As Pettit observes, a full statement of the requirements for civic freedom should therefore read as follows: 'the free individual is protected against the domination of others by the undominating and undominated state'. He adds that 'according to standard republican doctrine', individuals are meant to enjoy freedom as nondomination simply in virtue of 'being protected against the domination of others by an undominating state'. He accordingly concludes that the standard doctrine 'actually leaves something out', for 'those individuals will not be fully free if their state is dominated by other states'. I cannot agree that the early-modern theorists leave out the consideration that Pettit rightly highlights. Machiavelli, for example, always equates the conquest and colonization of one state by another with the enslavement of the conquered citizenry, while Richard Price makes the same argument pivotal to his defence of the American revolution in 1776. But Pettit is undoubtedly right that we cannot, according to the theorists I have been discussing, consider ourselves in possession of our liberty unless we live as citizens of a state which is free not merely from internal domination by monarchs or oligarchies, but also from external domination by other states.
The positive contention on which the republican theorists take their stand can thus be summarized as follows. You can hope to retain your individual freedom from dependence on the will of others if and only if you live as an active citizen of a state that is fully self-governing, and is consequently neither dominating nor dominated. This commitment makes the republican theorists sound like democrats, and it is certainly true that they think of sovereignty within free states as ultimately lying with the citizen-body as a whole. Generally, however, they modify this commitment in two ways. First, as Ivison notes, they espouse the cause of popular sovereignty largely for instrumental reasons, treating self-government less as an ideal in itself and more as a means -the only possible means -of securing the fundamental value of liberty as absence of dependence. Secondly, when the early-modern theorists declare that the law must express the general will of the people, they generally add that the people must be prepared to entrust their sovereignty to be exercised on their behalf by some form of representative government. Like Pettit, who speaks of 'representative states', they believe that it is appropriate to regard ourselves as living in a free state provided that our representatives can plausibly claim not merely to be speaking in our name but to be safeguarding our values and interests.
If we now turn to the views of our symposiasts about the proper relations between states, we find ourselves presented with a fascinating and valuable updating of exactly the early-modern vision of free states that I have now laid out. As Laborde and Pettit both show, what I have been describing as the second slogan of the early-modern theorists can be deployed in such a way as to make a direct and distinctive contribution to current discussions about the ideal of global justice.
The argument mounted by Laborde and Pettit contains, in effect, three principal steps. They both begin with the observation that a large number of states, as well as large numbers of international agencies, currently behave as dominating powers. As Pettit emphasizes, some of the most insidious of these forms of domination are currently exercised by corporations, international manufacturers and other such agencies with potentially global reach. They may never need to threaten to move their factories, or to finance opposition parties, or to promote damaging publicity, in order to be successful in persuading sufficiently weak states to offer them lax regulatory conditions, or the easing of environmental standards, or particularly favourable rates of tax. Their dominating power is sufficient in itself to ensure that they get their way. No threats and no reasoning are normally required.
The second step in Laborde's and Pettit's argument draws on the claims already put forward by the early-modern theorists about the relations between the freedom of individuals and of states. As they emphasize, when a state is dominated, one consequence is that it loses its freedom to act according to its own will in the organization of its affairs. But this is to say that its citizens are reduced to living in dependence on the goodwill of persons who are outside their control, but who nevertheless exercise alien control over each and every one of them. To live in a dominated state is thus to forfeit one's own individual liberty at the same time.
The final step in the argument similarly draws on early-modern views about what is morally unacceptable about such relationships of domination and dependence. One objection is that it is seriously humiliating for any state to lose its independent powers of agency, and hence to lose its ability to negotiate on terms of equal respect with other states. But the main objection is that freedom is a value of fundamental importance for states and citizens alike. To reduce a state to dependence on the goodwill of other states is to cause not merely the state but every one of its individual citizens to fall into a morally intolerable condition of servitude.
With this chain of reasoning, we arrive at a conclusion of considerable importance for the proper conduct of international affairs. The argument I have been outlining gives us strong reasons for requiring that no state -and no agency of comparable power -should dominate or seek to dominate any other state. We have been presented with a powerful principle for the better regulation of relations between individual states.
With this updating of what I have called the second slogan of republican theory, we arrive at perhaps the most important contribution that the republican tradition can make to contemporary political philosophy. Current discussions about global justice have become unsatisfactorily polarized around two opposed schools of thought. One focuses on the right of what Pettit calls representative states to enjoy freedom from interference in their internal affairs. The principle to which this gives rise is that states should avoid engaging in acts of interference and live on terms of equal respect. The other school of thought focuses on the alleged duty of representative states to take seriously the ideal of global distributive justice. The far more ambitious principle to which this gives rise is that representative states ought to arrange for this ideal to be progressively realized across the entire world. The outcome of this debate has been that, while proponents of the second view have objected that the first does not go nearly far enough, proponents of the first have tended to rejoin that the second is too utopian to be taken seriously.
Given this impasse, it seems to me that, as Laborde and Pettit have both impressively shown, there is something distinctive and important that the republican tradition can hope to offer as a means of carrying the argument forward in a more fruitful way. Laborde and Pettit both accept the principle that states ought basically to aim to live together on terms of mutual and equal respect. What they add to the argument is that one crucial precondition must be met if these terms are to be satisfied. As we have seen, the precondition is that states should take immediate steps to ensure that they do not act in such a way as to dominate other states. This is a far less utopian demand than that of the proponents of global equality, but its implementation would nevertheless transform our world, and I agree with Laborde and Pettit that such a transformation would be unambiguously beneficial in its effects.
